Playing the Field: Why Sports Teams Move and Cities Fight to Keep Them Review

Average Reviews:

(More customer reviews)"Playing the Field" is a well-written, scholarly work (Euchner is a professor of political science) which examines, as its subtitle succinctly states, "why sports teams move and cities fight to keep them." Euchner's work seems especially relevant now, in the wake of recent moves by teams in the NFL and NHL and the mind-numbing escalation in franchise values (over $500 million dollars for the expansion Cleveland Browns). "Playing the Field" charts the reasons for the growth of this phenomena, first focusing on the political and economic interrelationship of teams and cities, and also examining the unusual nature of the pro sports "industry". The book also presents "case studies" of three cities' experience with the movement of teams: Los Angeles, Baltimore, and Chicago.
Euchner, however, does not merely limit the book to observations and explanation of "why teams move and why cities fight to keep them". Euchner presents an interesting argument that cities negotiate from a re-active (rather than pro-active) approach that puts them at an inherent disadvantage; in sports parlance, they are always "playing defense". Within the case studies, he points to how the course of events may have been changed had the cities/states "played offense". This include everything from the NFL suing the Raiders for breach of contract before the Raiders filed the anti-trust suit against the NFL, the State of Maryland suing the NFL instead of suing Robert Irsay after the Colts' move, and the city of Chicago "playing hardball" with the White Sox rather than capitulating to their demands. Although the notion of "playing offense" in relocation negotiations appears to be his main answer for cities facing team relocation battles, Euchner also recommends several other solutions: congressional action, coalition building and collective agreements (treaties) between cities, and the formation of rival leagues.
This book would serve as an excellent resource and enlightening reading for city planners, public officials, students of political science, history, and urban studies, and the intellectual sports fan who is interested in the business behind the game. The book, however, does beg for an update. In particular, an examination of Baltimore's failed attempt to gain an NFL expansion franchise in 1993 and subsequent luring of the Cleveland Browns would make for a an appropriate addendum, as would Los Angeles' loss of both the Rams and Raiders in 1995.

Click Here to see more reviews about: Playing the Field: Why Sports Teams Move and Cities Fight to Keep Them

Can a sports franchise "blackmail" a city into getting what it wants-a new stadium, say, or favorable leasing terms-by threatening to relocate? In 1982, the owners of the Chicago White Sox pledged to keep the team in Chicago if the city approved a $5-million tax-exempt bond to finance construction of luxury suites at Comiskey Park. The city council approved it. A few years later, when Comiskey Park was in need of renovation, the owners threatened to move the team to Florida unless a new stadium was built. A site was chosen near the old stadium, property condemned, residents evicted, and a new stadium built. "We had to make threats," the owners said. "If we didn't have the threat of moving, we wouldn't have gotten the deal." "Sports is not a dominant industry in any city," writes Charles Euchner, "yet it receives the kind of attention one might expect to be lavished on major producers and employers." InPlaying the Field, Euchner looks at why sports attracts this kind of attention and what that says about the urban political process. Examining the relationships between Los Angeles and the Raiders, Baltimore and the Colts and the Orioles, and Chicago and the White Sox, Euchner argues that, in the absence of public standards for equitable arbitration between cities and teams, the sports industry has the ability to steer negotiations in a way that leaves cities vulnerable.According to Euchner, this greater leverage of sports franchises is due, at least in part, to their overall economic insignificance. Since the demands of a franchise do not directly affect many interest groups, opponents of stadium projects have difficulty developing coalitions to oppose them. The result is that civic leaders tend to succumb to the blackmail tactics of professional sports, rather than developing and supporting sound economic policies.